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Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA 
Abstract 
M e r  the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs 
to develop a “learning culture”, meaning a capability to learn &om past failures by understanding 
the techaical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many 
organizations learn fkom obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn 
from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because 
these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems 
could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces 
missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted 
as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of 
the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an 
outcome bias influences people’s evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed 
missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose 
mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss 
and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior 
managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held 
accountable for faulty _decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization 
learn kom the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the fkxe .  
Keywords: Near-Miss Bias, Decision Making, Organizational Learning 
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Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons ftom NASA 
Failures when examined with hindsight generally are attributed to poor decision making. 
As Fischoff (1 982) explains, once outcomes are hown, people tend to anchor on these outcomes 
and exaggerate what could have been anticipated at the time of the decision, even 
misrernembering their own predictions to be consistent with now-known outcomes (Fischoff & 
Beyth, 1975). That people anchor on outcomes and how the valence of the outcomes play an 
overly influential role in decision evaluations has come to be known as an “outcome bias”. 
Specifically, an outcome bias OCCUTS when the outcome of a decision, rather than the 
appropriateness of the decision, systematically influences people’s evaluations of the quality of 
the decision making (cf- Baron & Hershey, 1988; Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996). Yet, 
sometimes outcome failures are simply the result of bad luck, and sometimes successes are 
simply good luck. Consider a California community preparing for possible earthquakes. The 
community can make the same preparation decisions, but experience completely different 
outcomes if an earthquake occurs on a Friday afternoon during rush hour (i.e., Loma Prieta in 
1989) versus at 4:3Q am on a holiday (i.e., Northridge in 1994). In the case of a spacecraft 
mission to Mars, bad luck would include problems caused by terrain features (ie., hitting a sharp 
rock), severe weather, or launch failures. In the case of the Columbia accident, the catastrophe 
was partly caused by poor decision-making and partly by bad luck. The shuttle experienced bad 
luck in that the piece of foam debris struck the leading edge of the wing, a very sensitive portion 
of the orbiter. However, poor decision-making by project managers allowed similar pieces of 
foam to become detached at least thirty times on previous missions &d only good luck prevented 
a large enough piece of foam ftom striking a highly sensitive area on any of these previous 
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shuttle missions ( C A B ,  2003). A critical question from the point of organizational learning is 
thus to try to isolate the ex$ent to which any organizational outcome is pn’marily a result of 
decision making and when or how much is a result of luck 
In this paper we specifically explore how to more accurately deconstruct a decision 
outcome into the components of decision quality and luck by isolating a possible near-miss bias. 
A near-miss is an event that has some probability of a negative (even fatal) outcome and some 
probability of a positive (safe) outcome, but the actual outcome is non-hazardous. It is a “miss” 
in that the outcome is non-hazardous; it is “near” in the sense that the hazardous or fatal outcome 
could have occurred (Tinsley & Dillon, 2005; Dillon & Tinsley, 2005). A miss is the non- 
hazardous or successfid organizational outcome and a hit would be a hazardous or failed 
organizational outcome. A near-miss event is a success that could have been a failure except for 
good luck. Prior research on near-miss events documents that the luck component of the near- 
miss is discounted (Tinsley & Dillon, 2005; Dillon & Tinsley, 2005). Assuming luck is 
discounted, then near-misses, rather than being coded as almost hits will be coded as almost 
successes. Thus, near-miss events will not be attended to as they should; managers will not be 
held accountable for near-miss events, and as a result, organizations will fail to learn what they 
might fkom these experiences. This challenge seems to apply to both public and private 
organizations. We have begun our research in the highly visible arena of public space 
exploration because of the clear specificity of outcomes and the intense scrutiny with which 
failures are analyzed while near-misses and successes are rarely analyzed. Furthermore, NASA 
has specifically been called upon to function more like a learning organization in its fbture 
endeavors. 
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. The Outcome Bias. in Manageha1 Evaluations 
a .  
According to rational decision theories (e.g. Dawes, 1988), decision makers should be 
evaluated based on the appropriateness of their decision given their information at the t h e ,  
rather than the consequences of that decision. Because all decisions are made under mcertainQ, 
Edwards and colleagues liken a decision to a bet and chasten that evaluating a decision as “good 
or not must depend on the stakes and the odds, not on the outcome” (Edwards, Kiss, Majone, & 
Toda, 1984,7). Yet, in organizational settings it can be difficult to judge decision quality, 
especially as ambiguity of the situation or novelty of the decision task increase. Agency theorists 
have argued extensively that organizations have difEculty monitoring managerial actions (Jensen 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, it would be reasonable to assume organizations have difficulty 
judging the quality of a managerial action such as decision making. Because of this inability to 
monitor activities like managerial decision making, the consequential organizational outcomes of 
these decisions, and the valence of these outcomes, are used as proxies for managerial decision 
making. Hence, in organizations, as managers are evaluated for their decision making, we 
should see evidence of the outcome bias. Managerial decisions are likely to be evaluated based 
on the valence of the outcomes they produce, rather than on any “rational” analysis of the quality 
of the decisions themselves. 
This outcome bias in evaluating managerial action in organizations suggests that when a 
manager engages in a set of decisions that result in an organizational success that manager’s 
decision making should be evaluated more favorably than a manager whose set of decisions 
result in organizational failur-ven if both managers made the exact same set of decisions. 
Given the general need for cognitive consistency, inflated ratings of a manager’s decision ability 
(in the case of organizational successes rather than failures), may also produce significantly 
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higher ratings of a manager’ s other characteristics, such as competence, inteIligence, leadership 
ability, and general promotability. This would be consistent with Baron and Hershey’s (1988) 
data (study 4)’ showing that outcome bias extended beyond decisions to personal evaluations. 
Although none of Baron and Hershey’s studies were in an organizational context (they studied 
mostly student’s evaluations of others’ gambling decisions), we expect a similar spill-over effect 
to occw in our organizational setting, as well, because of an evaluators’ need for coherence in 
their judgments of others (cf- Festinger, 1957). 
In our terminology, an organizational failure is called a “hit”, in that the organization was 
hit by a failure or a disaster. Thus, an organizational success is called a “mis~’~. 
Hypothesis la: Managers whose decisions result in a miss (organizational success) will 
have their decision making evaluated in a significantly more favorable light than 
managers whose decisions result in a hit (organizational failure). 
Hypothesis 1 b: Managers whose decisions result in a miss (organizational success) will 
be judged to be more competent, to be more intelligent, to have more leadership ability, 
and to be more promotable than managers whose decisions result in a bit (organizational 
failure). 
/ 
The Near-hliss Effect 
Near-misses are events that could have ended in orgalnizational failure but that negative 
outcome was narrowly avoided. Narrowly avoiding a hit implies some risk of a future hit and 
some component of luck that the current event was not a hit (but rather a near-miss). We think it 
is useful to look at how these organizational outcomes (and thus the decisions preceding these 
outcomes) are judged as evidence of potential near-miss bias. On the one hand, a near-miss 
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could be celebrated as a success (a miss); evidence of a system’s resilience as failure is avoided. 
On the other hand, a near-miss could be soberly evaluated as a failure (a hit); evidence of a 
system’s vulnerability as a risk was taken in ignorance and failure was narrowly avoided. We 
first consider, prescriptively, how near-miss events should be judged, and then consider 
descriptively how near-miss events are most likely to be judged. Fhally, we consider the 
organizational learning that occurs in the alternative scenarios. 
Prescriptively, of course the “right” answer for how to interpret a near-miss event (as an 
almost success versus an almost failure) depends on the “true” risk involved in whatever 
organizational system is producing the outcome. If the “true” risk is high, then the near-miss 
should be coded as an almost failure in that the organization attends to the information from the 
near-miss event and learns how to take steps to decrease the risk in the future. E, on the other 
hand, the ‘Yrue” risk is low, then the near-miss event should be coded as an almost success so 
that the organization learns that the status quo is appropriate. The problem is that to divine the 
C k e ”  risk requires objectively processing the outcome events, which means accurately 
categorizing them as either some form of miss or some form of hit, and accurately assessing the 
extent to which luck played a role in the actual outcome. Hence, the question poses an 
endogeneity problem: we need to know the true risk to know how to categorize a current near- 
miss event, but to know the true risk requires having properly categorized prior near-miss events. 
So how, descriptively do people get out of this circularity? Do they judge a near-miss 
. event positively as an almost-miss or negatively as an almost-hit? Prospect theory suggests, an 
outcome’s valence is not judged in isolation but relative to a reference point (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). So the valence of a near-miss event should be judged good or bad, depending 
on the reference point to which it is compared. 
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Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) suggests that a stimulus event or outcome 
evokes its own fiame of reference for evaluation by evoking its own normative alternatives. 
Normative alternatives here refer to what could, should, or might have occurred, but did not. 
This is what others have called counterfactual tJinking (Galinsky et al., 2000). According to 
norm theory, dominant features of the stimulus event, such as the &ount of risk involved, are 
said to be immutable and to guide people’s spontaneous search for appropriate comparison 
alternatives. Those features of the event that could easily be imagined to have occurred 
differently are said to be mutable, and are what differentiate the normative alternative from the 
event itself. The more easily the mutable features can be imagined to OCCUT, the more “close” is 
the normative alternative to the event itself. Closer alternatives evoke stronger judgments (as to 
an outcomeSs valence) than less close alternatives (Miller & MacFarland, 1986). 
So what normative alternatives are evoked for a near-miss event? If a near-miss event 
evokes an organizational success as the comparison alternative, this should decrease the valence 
of the near-miss event. The thought process would be that this near-miss event was almost, but 
was not, a complete success. This near-miss event is less desirable than a success (a miss), 
which should generally lower the valence rating of the near-miss event. If, on the other hand the 
near-miss event evokes an organizational failure as the comparison alternative, this should 
increase the valence of the near-miss event. The thought process would be that this near-miss 
event was almost, but was not, an organizational failure. The near-miss event would be more 
desirable than a failure (hit), which should generally raise the valence rating of the near-miss 
event. 
Neither norm theory nor prospect theory makes any restrictions on the number of 
normative alternatives that can be evoked as reference points. If both normative alternatives are 
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evoked, then near-miss outcomes should be evaluated as more positive than hits but more 
negative than misses. Thus, managers whose decisions result in a near-miss should be judged 
between those whose decisions end in hits and those whose decisions end in misses. However, 
one nonnative alternative may be closer to a nem-miss than the other normative alternative, and 
if so, then it should exert more of an effect on the valence of the near-miss outcome. 
We propose that when a near-miss occurs it is easier to imagine how that near-miss event 
was different fiom a hit (failure) than it is different fiom a miss (success). Said otherwise, a 
near-miss is more like a miss than it is a hit. Both near-misses and misses end in success, rather 
than failure-even though the near-miss was almost a failure. Therefore, the hit outcome 
(failure> becomes a more salient alternative outcome state than the miss outcome, reinforcing 
that this near-miss was not a hit, and enhancing the valence of the near-miss outcome. Hence, 
we expect the near-miss outcomes to be judged more similarly to the miss outcomes than to the 
hit outcomes. 
This result would be consistent with prior research on the near-miss bias (cf- Tinsley & 
Dillon, 2005), which showed that people discounted the luck component in processing a near- 
miss event. When participants personally experienced near-miss events they were more risky in 
subsequent decision making ksks than people who did not experience near-miss events. This 
subsequent risky decision making suggests paxticipants who experienced near-miss events were 
discounting their own good luck because the near-miss was categorized as a miss. 
While prior research has shown people discount their own good luck in experiencing 
near-miss events, this study is proposing that people discount the good luck embedded in others' 
decision making and their subsequent outcomes. We are proposing that neutral third parties will 
discount the fact that near-misses are derived in part %om good luck, and will categorize these 
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near-miss events just as they would tnze misses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will have their decision 
making evaluated more favorably than managers whose decisions result in a hit and less 
favorably than managers whose decisions result in a miss. 
Hypothesis 2b: Managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will be judged more 
competent, intelligent, to have more leadership ability, and to be more promotable than 
managers whose decisions result in a hit and judged less competent, less intelligent, to 
have less leadership ability, and to be less promotable than managers whose decisions 
‘ 
result in a miss. 
Hypothesis 3: Managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will be judged closer to 
those whose decisions ended in a miss than to those whose decisions ended in a hit. 
Attenuating the Biases 
Some studies have shown the outcome bias can be attenuated when people have high 
accuracy motives, rather than low accuracy motives (Allison, Beggan, McDonald, & Rettew, 
1995). More recently, Agrawal and Maheswaran (2005) have shown that people with 
“accuracy” goals, who wish to be accurate in their judgments, show less outcome bias than 
people with “defensive” goals who want to defend an impression that is consistent with the 
outcome. The rationale here is that a desire for accuracy induces an elaboration of objective 
information, that is, a more balanced assessment of any situation. The more detailed the decision 
making, the more objective elaboration required, and hence the more balanced the ensuing 
decisions. This is thought to minimize the effects of heuristics and biases. Thus we propose that 
when people have to make more detailed judgments about specific decisions, these judgments 
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will show less bias than those of general decision making, competence, intelligence, leadership, 
or promotability . 
Hypothesis 4: Favorability evaluations of managers' specific decisions will show less 
outcome and near-miss biases than favorability evaluations of managers' general decision 
making, competence, intelligence, leadership, and promotability . 
Method: Materials, Participants, and Procedure 
This research builds on historical mission-case data currently available and being 
developed at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to investigate what NASA has learned fiom 
past mission successes, near-misses, and failures.' A case scenario was created loosely based on 
development details fiom the two NASA missiok TIMED and WIRE. TIMED (Thermosphere 
Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project) was an ambitious project when 
conceived in 1990 involving multiple spacecraft and nine instruments. When finally launched in 
2001, it was one spacecraft with four instruments. Development of the project shifted between 
GSFC and the Applied Physics Lab (APL), and the final four years of the project were a joint , 
effort of both centers (1990-1993 - GSFC project, 1994-1996 - APL project, 1997-2001 - 
APL/GSFC project). These management shifts resulted in confusion over reporting relationships 
and responsibility. Also, in several documented cases, GSFC managers felt that APL processes 
were not up to GSFC standards. Immediately after launch, the spacecraft experienced four 
guidance and control anomalies, but the operations team was able to quickly overcome the 
problems, and the mission met its level one science requirements and was therefore categorized a 
success. WIRE (Wide-Field Wared Explorer) was a project within the Small Explorer (SMEX) 
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' Full case studies are available at the website of the OEce of Mission Success at: 
www.missionsuccess.gsfc.nasa.gov. 
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program office. The SMEX program has been considered a very successful program with the 
exception of the WIRE mission failure. In the case of WIRE, GSFC was responsible for the 
overall mission, but the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was responsible for the inStnunent 
development. JPL contracted with a third party to develop the instrument electronics (including 
pyro control electronics). On-going “sibling rivalries” between GSFC and JPL and confusion 
over reporting relationships led to poor communications and responsibility conflicts for the 
project. Also, fairly late in the process, there was turnover in the instrument manager position at 
JPL. WIRE failed soon after launch in March 1999 when the cover on the instrument ejected 
prematurely and destabilized the spacecraft. The spacecraft was recovered and completed some 
investigations but did not achieve its primary science objectives. It was thus considered a 
failure. 
In our case scenario, three mission versions were created (miss, near-miss, and hit). In all 
tbree cases, the development problems were identical, and Chris, a project manager makes the 
same decisions about how to interact across the dBerent NASA centers,’ whether or not to skip a 
peer review and whether or not to delay the mission to investigate an unlikely problem but one 
that had the potential to be fatal for the mission. Appendix 1 shows the actual text of the 
In all three cases, because of turnover and tight schedules, Chris allowed the project 
to miss  a peer review of the electronics of the instnunent and decided not to investigate a last 
minute, potentially catastrophic (albeit low probability) design problem. The cases Mered only 
in project outcome. In the “miss” version, the reader is told that the mission was a complete 
success sending back useful data (i.e., there is no error shortly after launch). In the “near-miss 
version”, a problem occurs shortly after launch, and only because of the spacecraft’s alignment 
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In the case write-up given to students, the mission was originally named W l I E  after the actual NASA mission. 
This was not a problem because no students were familiar with the actual mission. The name was changed to a 
2 
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to the sun, the problem is NOT catastrophic to the mission. In the “hit” version, the same 
problem occurs shortly after launch and only because of the spacecraft’s alignment to the m the 
problem IS catastrophic. 
After reading the case scenario, participants rated Chris’ decision making ability, 
competence, intelligence, leadership, and whether Chris should be promoted to a larger project 
arid or whether Chris should be fired. They also rated two of Chris’ specific decisions: the 
decision to skip the peer review and the decision not to investigate a last .minute, low probability, 
venting problem. AI1 ratings were done on a 7 point Likert scale, with 7 being most positive and 
1 being least positive. Particip&ts were also asked to supply demographic information (age,. 
gender) as well as project management and general people management experience. 
Data were collected &om three groups of participants: NASA managers (N=24), MBA 
students at a large eastern university (N=95), and undergraduate business students at that same 
university (N==83)_ NASA managers filled out the exercise as part of a training course on project 
management. The students filled out the exercise as part of their classroom activities, during a 
lesson on general decision making., . 
Analysis and Results 
Control variables 
Bivariate correlation showed that, as expected, the dependent variables were sigtdicantly 
correlated with each other (see Table 1). The analysis also showed that age was correlated to 
three dependent variables: intelligence (p<.Ol), the dedision not to investigate the possible vent 
issue (p<.05), and whether or not Chris should be fired @<.01), and managerial experience was 
correlated to whether or not Chris should be fired (p<.05). Age and managerial experience 
fictitious name in the version provide to NASA managers. 
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differed significantly across the three samples (age: NASA managers: mean = 43.1, standard 
deviation = 7.77; Ml3A mean = 29.4, standard deviation = 3.31; undergraduate mean = 19.4, 
standard deviation = 0.96; F (2, 135) = 412; pC.001; managed people: NASA managers = 84%; 
MBA = 72%; Undergraduate = 32%). Thus to conserve degrees of fieedom, “sample” was used 
as a covariate in the analyses to control for any response differences due to age and managerial 
experience. ’ 
A MANOVA was performed since the dependent variables (decision ability, competence, 
Condition (miss, near-miss, Et) was the intelligence, etc.) are correlated (Devore, 1987). 
independent variable and sample was entered as a covariate. 
Sample had a Significant impact on the data. Univariate F statistics were marginally 
significant for competence (F (2,198) = 2.8, p=.09) and intelligence 0; (2,198) = 3.1, p=.08) and 
significant for leadership ability (F (2, 198)= 7.9, p<.Ol) and whether or not to fire Chris (F (2, 
198) = 10.6, p=.OOl). Post-hoc contrasts, using Tukey HSD, showed that these Univariate 
differences were driven by NASA managers having rated Chris as significantly more competent 
(NASA mean = 4.8, standard deviation = 1.17; MBA mean = 4.3, standard deviation = 1 - 16; UG 
mean = 4.2., standard deviation = 1.17) and more intelligent (NASA mean = 5.13, standard 
deviation = 1.22; MI3A mean= 4.1, standard deviation = 1.22; UG mean = 4.3, standard 
deviation = 1.22) than the other two groups. The MBA managers rated Chris to have 
significantly less leadership ability (NASA mean = 5.3, standard deviation = 1.41; MBA mean = 
4.7, standard deviation = 1.40; UG mean = 5.2, standard deviation = 1.40) than the other two 
groups, and the NASA managers were significantly less likely to think frring Chris would be 
appropriate (NASA mean = 2.6, standard deviation = 1.5; MBA mean = 4.2, standard deviation = 
1.49; UG mean = 4.3, standard deviation = 1.49). Thus it appears that, in general, the NASA 
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managers tended to rate Chris a bit more favorably than the other two groups. 
Very importantly, however, there were no significant interaction effects between sample 
and condition, meaning that the pattern of responses was not different across the dlfferent 
samples, Le., the effect of condition on ratings of Chris and Chris’ decisions were the same 
across all the samples examined. Thus for hypothesis testing, all participants were used, and 
while sample was used as a covariate in the analysis, we report only results from all participants 
together. 
Hypothesis testing 
I 
The MANOVA with condition as an independent variable and sample as a covariate had 
a significant multivariate F for condition (test: Wilks’ Lambda(l6,382)= 2.64, p<.OOl) meaning 
that the ratings of the project manager across the three cases (miss, near-miss, hit) were different. 
Univariate F statistics showed significant differences for decision ability (F(2, 198)= 5.3, 
p<.Ol), competence (F(2, 198)= 7.7, p=.OOl), leadership ability (F(2, 198)= 4.2, p<.05), and the 
decision to promote the manager to a larger project (F(2, 198)= 15.2, p<.OOl). Univariate F 
statistics showed significant differences for participant’s assessments of Chris’ specific 
decisions: peer review decision (F(2,198)= 3.5, p<.05), and the decision to ignore potential vent 
issue (F(2, 198)= 6.7, p=.OOl). No significant differences were seen in an assessment of the 
project manager’s intelligence or in whether or not to fire the manager following the outcome of 
the project across conditions. Post-hoc contrasts, using Tukey HSD, were used to test 
hypotheses as to which conditions were significant fkom each other. Table 2 summarizes these 
statistical comparisons for the dependent variables by condition and Figure 1 provides a 
graphical representation of the mean responses by condition. 
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. Hypothesis 1 a proposed managers whose decisions result in a miss will have their 
decision making evaluated in a significantly more favorable light than managers whose decisions 
result in a hit. This was supported. Managers whose decisions result in a miss had a decision 
ability average of 4.7 (standard deviation = 1.59, whereas managers whose decisions result in a 
hit had a decision ability average of 3.8 (standard deviation = 1.75) (Tukey HSD, p=.006). 
Hypothesis l b  proposed that managers whose decisions result in a miss will be judged 
more competent, intelligent, to have more leadership ability, and to be more promotable than 
managers whose decisions result in a hit. This hypothesis was mostly supported; it was 
supported for competence (miss mean = 4.7, standard deviation = 1.27; hit mean = 3.9, standard 
deviation = 1.28, p=.OOl), leadership ability (miss mean= 5.4, standard deviation = 1.18, hit 
mean=4.6, standard deviation = 1.62, p=.Ol), and promotability (miss mean = 3.9, standard 
deviation = 1.58; hit mean = 2.7, standard deviation = 1.48, p<.OOl), but not for general 
intelligence. 
Hypothesis 2a proposed that managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will have 
their decision making evaluated more favorably than managers whose decisions result in a hit 
and less favorably than managers whose decisions result in a miss. This was partially supported. 
The hit condition (mean = 3.8, standard deviation = 1.75) was significantly different from the 
near-miss condition (mean = 4.4, standard deviation = 1.61; p=.05), but the near-miss and miss 
conditions were not significantly different fiom each other. 
Hypothesis 26 proposed that managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will be 
judged more competent, intelligent, to have more leadership ability, and to be more promotable 
than managers whose decisions result in a hit and judged less competent, intelligent, to have less 
leadership ability, and to be less promotable than managers whose decisions result in a miss. 
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This was partidly supported. Just as above, for competence, the hit condition was sigmficantly 
different fiom the near-miss condition (mean = 4.4, standard deviation = 1.19, p=.OO7); but the 
near-miss condition was not SignifkantJy different from the miss condition. Again for 
promotability, the hit condition was significantly different fkom the near-miss condition (mean = 
3.5, standard deviation = 1.53; p=.OOl), but the near-miss condition and miss condition were not 
significantly different from each other. 
Hypothesis 3 proposed t h t  managers whose decisions result in a near-miss will be 
evaluated closer to those whose decisions ended in a miss than to those whose decisions ended in 
a hit. The pattern of responses for Hypotheses 2a and 2b conf i i s  Hypothesis 3. For decision 
ability, competence, and promotability, the near-miss condition was SignificantIy different fiom 
the miss condition but not significantly different fiom the hit condition. The data show that 
managers whose decisions result in a near-miss are evaluated very similarly to those whose 
decisions end in a miss, but significantly differently from those whose decisions result in a hit. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that favorability evaluations of managers’ specific decisions will 
show less outcome and near-miss biases than favorability evaluations of managers’ general 
decision making, competence, intelligence, leadership, and promotability. As noted above, the 
univariate F statistics showed significant differences for participant’s assessments of Chris’ 
specific decisions: peer review decision (F(2, 198)= 3.5, p<.05), decision to ignore potential 
vent issue (F(2,198)= 6.7, p=.OOl), suggesting little support for this hypothesis. Post hoc 
comparisons showed that for the peer review decision, the near-miss (mean = 2.9, standard 
deviation = 1.37) was significantly different from the hit condition (mean = 2.4, standard 
deviation = 1.29; p=0.04), but was not significantly different from the miss  condition (mean = 
2.9, standard deviation = 1.27). For the decision to ignore the potential vent issue and launch as 
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scheduled, &e miss condition (mean = 3.6, standard deviation = 1.67) was significantly different 
&om the hit condition (mean = 2.7, standard deviation = 1.51; p=.OOl), and the near-miss 
condition (mean=3.2, standard deviation = 1.73) was marginally.dif5erent from the hit condition 
(p=. 10) but not significantly different fiom the miss condition. Thus, overall, it appears that the 
pattern of data for the evaluations of the specific decisions mirrors that found in the more general 
decisions, thus hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Discussion 
Participants rated project managers whose decisions ended in a miss  (organizational 
success) in a significantly more positive light than they rated project managers whose decision 
ended in a hit (organizational failure). Supporting H1, participants rated project managers with 
miss outcomes as having significantly higher decision ability than project managers with hit 
outcomes. Supporting H2, this outcome bias spilled over to other characteristics of the project 
managers, such that those managers with miss outcomes were rated as significantly more 
competent, having more leadership abilityy and being more deserving of a promotion than project 
managers with hit outcomes. The lack of differences for intelligence may stem from the fact that 
this construct is too general. Outcome valence may bias people’s perception of decision quality 
and other domain-related (here, project management- related) attributes, such as competence, 
leadership, and promotability. Whereas, context-fiee characteristics like general intelligence 
may be more immune to outcome bias. 
Aside fiom the general outcome bias, the results for how near-miss events were 
categorized shows evaluations were also influenced by a near-miss bias. Partial support for H2a 
and H2b and the general support of €33 showed that project managers whose decisions resulted in 
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a near-miss were judged in between project managers with miss outcomes and those with bit 
outcomes, yet were categorized closer to project managers with miss  outcomes than those with 
hit outcomes. In fact in this data, there were few signifcant differences in the categorization of 
near-misses and misses, and quite a few significant differences in the categorization of near- 
misses and hits. This skew in the categorization of near-miss events is quite important, 
explaining why we claim “bias” in the processing of near-miss events. If near-miss events were 
processed objectively, then they should be categorized as either hits or misses, depending on how 
close they were to being actual hits or misses, that is-depending on the extent to which good 
luck prevented a near-miss fkom being a hit. Over a diverse group of participants, we would 
have expected some to categorize near-misses as misses and some to categorize near-misses as 
hits. The fact that near-miss events were systematically being categorized as misses (and being 
distinct from hits), suggests people are discounting the luck component of a decision’s outcome. 
Again this is consistent with prior work which showed that people discounted the luck involved 
in their own near-miss events (that they were not fatalities) (Tinsley & Dillon, 2005). Here we 
show that objective, neutral observers discounted the luck involved in others’ decision outcomes. 
That is,> participants here discounted others’ good luck in achieving a near-miss rather than a hit. 
This is somewhat remarkable since prior work on attribution errors, suggests that 
individuals will discount their own good luck, making internal attributions for their own good 
outcomes (the so-called, “self-serving attributional bias”, Miller & Ross, 1975) but be more 
resistant to discounting others’ good luck, as they are able to discern external reasons for others’ 
good outcomes. Lau and Russell (1980) for example have shown that the self-serving 
attributional bias (the tendency to make internal attributions for one’s own success) extends to 
close fiiends and other groups to which one is allied, but does not generally extend beyond this 
19 
set of in-group members. Our participants (particularly the students) were in no sense in-group 
members with the project managers they were evaluating, thus there should be no impulse to 
make internal attributions for positive outcomes and discount the component of good luck in 
these outcomes. Yet, our participants did still discount the component of good luck in the project 
managers’ near-miss outcomes, believing that these near-miss outcomes implied the project 
managers had good decision ability, competence, leadership ability and promotability. 
Additionally, while our sample size of NASA managers was too small to statistically 
examine their responses exclusively, the trend (as can be seen in Figure 1) is for NASA 
managers to actually evaluate Chris in the near-miss case as higher than Chris in the miss case. 
This certainly may be consistent with norm and prospect theory in that in the near-miss case, 
participants are comparing it to a success and mentally anchoring on that outcome, while in the 
miss’case, no comparisons are invoked. Additional data collection exercises are already 
scheduled with NASA, so we will have the opportunity to examine this behavior further in future 
research. 
Attenuating; the Bias 
Future research should look at factors that might attenuate this near-miss bias. We 
reasoned that an elaboration of objective information might produce a more balanced assessment 
of the near-miss events. The more detailed the decision making, the more objective elaboration 
required, and hence we reasoned that participants judgments of project managers’ specific 
decision might show less outcome bias and less near-miss bias than their evaluations of project 
managers’ general decision making ability (K4). Unfortunately, our data did not support this. It 
is possible that our within subjects design led to this lack of support. Once participants had 
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evaluated a project managers general ability as either high or low (depending on whether the 
project manager had a miss, near-miss, or hit outcome), cognitive consistency impelled them to 
judge the specific decision in a similar fashion. A between subjects design, where some 
participants judge only the specific decisions made, might show that evaluation of more specific 
decisions shows less bias than evaluation of general decision making. 
Another condition that might attenuate the near-miss bias would be a prime to make 
salient the good luck component of any decision outcome. One way to make luck salient might 
be to ask participants to imagine alternative outcomes to the near-miss event, and how and why 
the near-miss event is not a hit. Mutable (changeable) factors that explain why a near-miss event 
is not a hit should prompt people to more readily imagine the near-miss event as a hit, as norm 
theory dictates that mutable factors between an event and it’s normative alternative increase the 
perceived “closeness” of the event and its nonnative alternative (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). 
“Mutable” here does not mean that it is within the power of the project manager to make the 
changes that turn the event (near-miss) into the normative alternative (hit), only that it is 
imaginable that a factor could change. In om scenario, the mutable factor is the alignment of the 
sun with the spacecraft. In the near%iss condition, the alignment was said to mitigate the 
damage done by the venting problem, in the hit condition the alignment was said to further the 
damage done by the venting problem. The sun’s alignment is mutable if participants could 
imagine that the sun might be aligned.differently so as to cause a hit rather than a near-miss. 
Imulications for Organizational Learning and Organizational Culture 
The outcome bias and near-miss bias will clearly impact organizational learning. When 
NASA experiences a failure or hit, a formal investigation board is convened to identify the 
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factors that contributed to the outcome. Yet, as we suspect happens in most organizations, near- 
misses do not command the same type of attention. For example, within the space shuttle 
program, much of the prior debris problems could have caused a similar catastrophic failure as it 
did on the Columbia mission except that on previous missions, everyone was l u c b  that a large 
piece did not hit a highly sensitive portion of the orbiter. Thus, with bindsight, we might suggest 
that the Columbia accident was partly caused by poor decision-making and partly by bad luck. 
The shuttle experienced bad luck in that the piece of foam debris struck the leading edge of the 
wing, a very sensitive portion of the orbiter. However, poor decision-making by project 
managers allowed similar pieces of foam to become detached at least thirty times on previous 
missions and only good luck prevented a large enough piece of foam fiom striking a highly 
sensitive area on any of these previous shuttle missions (CAIB, 2003). Without the obvious 
technical failure, everyone interpreted the near-miss events as successful missions, and this 
acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers. 
Hence, what was at one point a cause for concern (the debris) because a normal occurrence. 
Deviance became normalized (Vaughn, 1996). Hence the near-miss bias.explains, in part, how a 
culture may come to embrace more risk, or deviance, and how it fails to learn what steps to tabe 
to mitigate that risk. 
Another mechanism by which the near-miss bias may become instantiated in a culture 
and lead to a culture of risk taking, involves the risk propensities of the managers who get 
promoted. Recall that in this study, project managers whose decisions resulted in a near-miss 
were judged as significantly more competent and deserving of a promotion than project 
managers whose decisions result in a hit. This difference occurred even though it was quite 
clear in both conditions that the spacecraft did experience a venting problem and it was clear that 
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it was only because of the sun’s alignment that the outcome was either a near-miss or a hit. This 
suggests that even when a problem occurs down the road that is reasonably linked to prior 
managerial decisions (in both cases Chris makes the decision not to investigate the venting 
issue), that manager is not held accountable for any faulty decision making if the project 
outcome is unharmed. Thus both that manager and the organization as a whole miss a learning 
opportunity for collecting data on how to mitigate future risks. 
Moreover, our data showed that managers whose decisions end in misses or near-misses 
were judged significantly more competent, having more leadership and decision making ability, 
and being more deserving of promotions than those whose decision ended in a hit. Hence, 
managers who experience near-misses are more likely to move up the corporate ladder than 
managers whose decisions end in unsuccessful outcomes. Prior work documents that people 
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who had experienced a near-miss made significantly more risky decisions in the future, than 
dose who had not experienced a near-miss (Tinsley & Dillon, 2005). Assuming that those who 
experience near-misses make riskier subsequent decisions and that those whose decisions end in 
near-misses move up the corporate ladder, than those who are promoted should, in general, 
embody more risk that those who axe not promoted (experienced bad luck and had a hit). 
Assuming the level of risk reflected in an organization’s decisions is more heavily weighted by 
the risk tolerance of those at high rather than low levels of the organizations, then near-miss 
events will bias organizations towards riskier decisions over time as risk tolerant managers 
advance. The near-miss bias thus becomes institutionalized and embodied within an 
organization. 
ConcIusion 
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The evaluation of a manager’s decision making reflects both an outcome bias and a near- 
miss bias. Managers whose decisions ended in a fdure were perceived as ha*g SigrSficantly 
less decision making ability, being significantly less competent, showing significantly less 
leadership ability and being significantly less deserving of promotions than managers who made 
the same decisions but whose project outcomes were either a success or a near-miss. Strikingly, 
there were no significant differences between the miss (success) and near-miss condition, rather 
near-misses appear to be systematically categorized as miss events rather than hit (failure) 
events. The differences between the near-miss and hit conditions mean that even when a 
problem occurs down the road that is readily linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project 
outcome is not harmed because of luck then managers experiencing the good luck are not held 
accountable for any faulty decision making. This severely hampers the learning potential from 
near-miss events for both the managers and the organization, and it suggests a mechanism by 
which the near-miss bias becomes instantiated in an organizational culture. 
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